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We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical
announcements about their ‘‘possible’’ contributions and, in some treatments, send
written promises to contribute speciﬁc amounts. We ﬁnd that announcements were
responded to both by others’ announcements and by real play, for example
announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also ﬁnd
that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase
efﬁciency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of
punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when
promise statements can be sent is the effect sufﬁcient for achieving greater efﬁciency.
& 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
0. Introduction
Many experiments have been conducted to study to what degree and under what conditions individuals free ride in the
voluntary provision of a public good. The question is much studied in economic theory and is relevant to problems ranging
from the making and soliciting of charitable contributions to environmental protection, provision of effort in partnerships,
and work in teams. In experiments, contributions typically begin at an average level well above predicted full free riding, in
fact at more than 50% of subjects’ endowments, but they decline steadily with repetition. Mechanisms that have been
found to reduce free riding include taxing low contributors and rewarding high ones (Falkinger et al., 2000), allowing
subjects to impose costly earnings reductions on one another (Fehr and Ga ¨chter, 2000a), and excluding free riders from
playing with more cooperative subjects (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; O ¨nes and Putterman, 2007; Ga ¨chter and Tho ¨ni,
2005). However, in a review of 37 VCM, prisoners’ dilemma, and other social dilemma studies, Sally (1995) found pre-play
communication to be the single most effective way to promote cooperation, and in a direct comparison under controlled
conditions, Bochet et al. (hereafter BPP, 2006) found not only that pre-play face-to-face communication increased
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sanction opportunities to it led to no further improvement in outcomes.
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BPP also reported VCM experiments with two other kinds of communication. First, they conducted chat room
treatments in which subjects could communicate with the members of their group on line only, while maintaining
anonymity as to who was in one’s group. Second, they carried out ‘‘numerical cheap talk’’ (NCT) treatments in which
subjects (also anonymous to one another) could announce, by typing a number, a ‘‘possible amount’’ that they might
contribute to the group account. Chat room treatments yielded higher levels of cooperation than baseline, despite
the unavailability of facial expression, vocal intonation, and body language as means of conveying intention, emotion, or
other information. Unlike the treatments that allowed the exchange of written messages, however, the numerical
announcement treatments did not enhance average cooperation relative to the no communication baseline. A similar
experiment using numerical announcements, by Wilson and Sell (1997), also found them to be ineffective at engendering
cooperation.
This paper attempts to shed further light on the difference of outcomes between numerical and verbal communication.
We ask two main questions. First, is numerical communication truly cheap talk in the sense of being discounted by both
senders and receivers, thus amounting to ineffective babble? Second, are Sally (1995) and BPP correct in their conjecture
that a major reason for the efﬁcacy of verbal communication is the ability to issue promises?
We explore the ﬁrst question by carrying out a microanalysis of the data from BPP’s NCT treatment. We demonstrate
that the patterns of numerical signals sent by subjects are far from random, and that the indifferent average results of
numerical signaling mask a dispersion of outcomes that includes both groups that achieved greater cooperation than their
most successful counterparts in treatments with no communication and groups that, due to opportunistic reliance on false
signaling by some members, achieved even less cooperation than their least successful no communication counterparts.
Both the coordination successes and the false signaling ‘‘disasters’’ indicate that subjects took numerical announcements as
something other than cheap talk in a sense that we elaborate below.
We explore the second question by adding treatments in which subjects can elect to send non-binding promise
statements as a follow-up to their numerical signals. Our results show that adding only a promise option had no impact on
the level of average contribution compared to the baseline treatment. However, the option of sending promise messages
signiﬁcantly improved outcomes in those groups whose members were also given the opportunity to sanction one another
with costly punishment. We perform the same type of microanalysis of promise treatment behaviors as of those in the
simpler NCT treatments. The data exhibit similar patterns, but we ﬁnd that individuals paid more attention to promises
than to announced contributions, and that when punishment was allowed, broken promises were severely punished and
thus the percentage of false promises declined with repetition, allowing promises to grow in credibility.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we discuss the literature on public goods games and communication.
Section 2 lays out the design of the public goods experiments with and without numerical communication, sanction option,
and promise option, and discusses theoretical predictions. Section 3 analyzes the experiments, emphasizing the impact of
communication content on both others’ communication and on binding decisions. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1. Voluntary contribution experiments and communication
The voluntary contribution mechanism is an n-person linear public goods game with the following structure. In each of
one or more periods (we focus on games of ﬁnite repetition), each of nX3 individuals is endowed with a certain number of
dollars, E, and must divide this between a private account and a group or public account. Money put in the group account is
multiplied by a factor l (where n4 l4 1) and divided equally among the n group members. The earnings of member i in a
given period are




where Ci (0pCipE) is individual i’s contribution to the group account and the summation is taken over all group members, i
included. Eq. (1) shows that all group members are better off if all contribute their full endowments to the group account
than if they contribute nothing, but each individual is better off still if the others contribute but he does not. Efﬁciency,
deﬁned as the sum of earnings, is also highest when all contribute their full endowments. We focus on the symmetric case
in which each has an equal endowment and information about endowments and payoff functions is common knowledge.
In a ﬁnitely repeated VCM game, the only subgame perfect equilibrium for rational individuals who care only to
maximize their own payoffs and who have common knowledge of one another’s preferences (including knowledge of one
another’s knowledge of this) is Ci ¼ 0 for each i. While an outcome having Ci ¼ E for all players dominates it, there is no
credible way to punish deviations from an agreement to contribute E, so communication cannot in principle alter the
outcome.
2 Communication can change the outcome only if (a) payoffs can be altered in a manner external to the game, for
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similar except that the combination of communication and punishment achieves better results than communication alone, in their experiment.
2 A strategy of cooperating if others cooperate unravels because it is in no player’s interest to cooperate in the last period.
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such as the state, or if (b) we drop the common knowledge and/or payoff maximization assumptions, allowing that some
players’ objective functions do not coincide with their material payoffs and/or that some players entertain the belief that
players with such preferences might be present.
Isaac and Walker (1988) found that pre-play communication led their experimental subjects to contribute considerably
more to a public good. Their study is one of 37 papers reporting 130 experimental treatments whose results Sally (1995)
entered in multivariate regressions investigating which treatment variables best account for differing levels of cooperation
and free riding. Sally concluded that face-to-face communication was the single most effective of the treatment variables,
which also included the size of the monetary gain from cooperation, the number of repetitions, the discipline from which
student participants were drawn, and the use of suggestive instructions by the experimenter.
To understand better what lies behind the effects of face-to-face communication, Brosig et al. (hereafter BOW, 2003) and
BPP conducted additional VCM experiments in which other forms of communication were substituted for face-to-face
discussion. BOW’s comparison treatments included a no-communication baseline, a treatment with audio and visual
communication from separated compartments, a treatment with only audio communication from separated compart-
ments, and a treatment in which subjects could view one another on video terminals but could not communicate, prior to
making their decisions. BPP’s alternative treatments likewise included a no-communication baseline, but in addition, they
conducted a treatment in which subjects could communicate text messages in a chat room and one in which subjects could
relay non-binding possible choices in numerical form, with time for iterative reactions before each binding decision stage.
For each of the four communication variants, BPP conducted two kinds of public goods game—a standard VCM treatment,
and one like Fehr and Ga ¨chter’s having a ‘‘punishment’’ stage.
3
While some of BOW and BPP’s treatments achieved almost equally large efﬁciency gains as did their face-to-face
communication treatments, BPP’s NCT treatments performed no differently on average than did their no communication
baseline. In this paper, we reanalyze the BPP treatments at the level of individual subject behaviors. We demonstrate that
numerical announcements were taken seriously by group members, affecting both subsequent announcements and
subsequent binding play. For example, in the treatment with numerical communication and punishment stages, subjects
announced larger punishments of those who announced smaller contributions, the same relationship as exhibited in
binding play, and those at whom such announced punishments were targeted responded by raising their announced
contributions, a reaction also seen in binding play. Actual contributions are signiﬁcantly correlated with both own and
others’ announced contributions, and actually contributing less than the amount announced tended to elicit actual costly
punishment. A micro-analysis of announcements and binding decisions thus provides evidence that subjects did not
understand their messages to be ‘‘cheap talk’’ in the full sense suggested by a theory of rational, self-interested agents with
common knowledge of one another’s type.
When discussing why pre-play communication raises cooperation, contrary to standard economic theory, but why this
effect is observed only when that communication has an open-ended written or oral component, we conjectured that the
ability to make promises plays a major role in raising rates of cooperation in treatments with face-to-face, audio–video, and
chat room communication. To test this conjecture, we designed additional treatments identical to NCT, except that after
iterative numerical communication and before each binding choice, we let subjects select, or not, a message promising to
contribute a speciﬁc amount to the group account. We analyze the resulting treatments, ﬁnding that allowing promises
signiﬁcantly increased both contributions and earnings, but only when punishment opportunities were available to keep
promise breakers in line.
2. Experimental design and predictions
We discuss decisions made in 18 experimental sessions, in each of which 16 (in four of the sessions, 12) undergraduate
subjects (a total of 272 subjects) made a series of contribution decisions in randomly assigned and anonymous groups of
four that stayed together for a total of 10 periods of play. Each period involved simultaneous decisions by each subject on
contributing to a group account versus a personal account, described by Eq. (1) above, with E ¼ 10 experimental dollars
(hereafter E$10) and l ¼ 1.6, so that group members earned E$16 per period if they perfectly cooperated and E$10 if they all
contributed nothing.
4 Subjects were drawn from the entire Brown University undergraduate population (numbering
some 5800 students), sat at terminals in a large room, and were unable to read one another’s screens or to communicate
except in the treatments and manners indicated below. Three sessions were devoted to each of six different treatments
(see Table 1), of which the ﬁrst four are also discussed in BPP. In the baseline (B) treatment, the entire session consisted of
10 such decisions, after each of which subjects learned of one another’s individual contribution decisions. In the
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3 BPP’s chat room communication treatment without punishment resembled that of Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998), except that those authors
used e-mail messages, which do not provide a continuing record of messages to all group members. BPP’s non-binding numerical communication
treatment without punishment, which we labeled ‘‘numerical cheap talk,’’ resembled the numerical pre-announcement treatment of Wilson and Sell
(1997), except that our subjects could react to one another’s announcements with new nonbinding announcements for a period of a minute or longer
before making binding decisions, whereas Wilson and Sell’s subjects could send only one announcement before each binding decision.
4 An experimental dollar exchanged for 0.13 real dollars at the end of the session, and total earnings averaged about $25 for a 90min session,
including a $5 participation fee.
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contributions of each of the others in their group and had an opportunity to reduce the earnings of one or more group
members at a ﬁxed cost of E$0.25 to the punisher per E$1 of earnings loss to the person punished. Individuals were
informed only of the reductions they themselves received, without knowing the identities of the punishers. Subjects in all
four treatments were identiﬁed to one another only by letters B, C and D which were randomly reassigned each period
(as in Fehr and Ga ¨chter, 2000a), to prevent tracking of individual behaviors and thus reduce the tendency to carry out
vendettas.
In the ‘‘numerical cheap talk’’ (NCT) and ‘‘numerical cheap talk with reduction opportunities’’ (NCTwR) treatments,
so-referred to because of the expectation of standard theory that announcements would amount to no more than cheap
talk, each set of binding contribution and reduction decisions was preceded by a period of announcements and amended
announcements. During these periods in the NCT treatment, subjects simply entered an amount in the group account
assignment box of a screen identical to the binding decision interface (reproduced in BPP) but for the heading
‘‘Communication Stage’’ and a different background color. Once each had entered some number and the four numbers were
displayed to each group’s members, they were free to alter their announced numbers for up to 90 seconds (a smaller
amount of time in later periods).
5 In the communication stages of the NCTwR treatment, subjects ﬁrst entered possible
contribution amounts, then, viewing the amounts entered by each group member, entered possible reduction amounts.
Once a subject saw the four contribution announcements and the total reduction of her own earnings announced by others,
she was free to alter either her announced contributions or her announced reductions of others’ earnings for up to 90
seconds (again, a smaller amount of time in later periods).
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After ﬁnding that average contributions and earnings in the B and NCT (the R and NCTwR) treatments were not
signiﬁcantly different, we designed a variation on the NCT and NCTwR treatments as a partial test of our conjecture that
this might be attributable to unavailability of a way to make verbal commitments or promises. The new treatments are
identical to the old ones, including a period of iterative numerical communication of non-binding ‘‘possible’’ choices.
However, at the end of each period’s numerical communication stage and before its binding contribution stage, subjects
were asked to choose between two statements. The ﬁrst option read: ‘‘I promise to contribute __ to the group account this
period.’’ and it required the choice of an integer in the 0–10 range, if selected. The other option read: ‘‘I do not wish to make
a promise at this time.’’ Depending upon the choice of the subject, the other group members would then be shown either
the statement ‘‘A promises to contribute X to the group account’’ (where X ¼ 0,1,y10) or ‘‘A chooses not to make a
promise,’’ and likewise for subjects B, C and D. The instructions given the subjects refer to ‘‘choosing a statement’’ rather
than to ‘‘making a promise.’’ We label the promise-including analogue of the B and NCT treatments NCTwP, and the
promise-including analogue of the R and NCTwR treatments NCTwP&R.
A dilemma for us in designing these treatments was what, if anything, to tell the subjects about whether a promise was
binding. If there were no statement about this and if a high proportion of subjects contributed the amounts typed into their
promise statements, we would be unable to rule out the explanation that they adhered to their promises because they
understood the rules of the experiment to require them to do so. To rule out the possibility that promises were effective
because of such a misunderstanding, we included in the instructions about entering binding decisions the statement ‘‘If
you have chosen to promise a speciﬁc amount, you can type that amount at this time, but the computer will not prevent
you from typing in a different amount.’’ This statement carried its own danger, because it may have been viewed as the
granting of ‘‘permission to lie’’ by the experimenter; in fact, when instructions were being read aloud, there were a few
chuckles or raised eyebrows among the subjects at this point in every session. Our results must be read, then, with an
awareness of the downward bias against the efﬁcacy of promises that we may have introduced by expressly stating that
promises were not binding.
Standard economic theory assuming strictly payoff-maximizing agents with common knowledge of this preference






None Baseline (B)—12 groups (48 subjects) Reduction (R)—12 groups (48 subjects)
Numerical announcements Numerical cheap talk (NCT)—11 groups (44
subjects)




Numerical cheap talk with promise option
(NCTwP)—11 groups (44 subjects)
Numerical cheap talk with promise and reduction options
(NCTwP&R)—11 groups (44 subjects)
5 The instructions about this were: ‘‘At the beginning of each period there will be a communication stage. You will type in a possible amount for your
group assignmenty at any time thereafter during this stage, you can adjust your possible assignment to the group account.y You are not committed to
any of the numbers you type in during this stage.’’
6 The full instructions given to the subjects, including practice problems, are provided in Bochet et al. (2005).
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have no effect on the level of contributions, which will still be uniformly zero. The addition of an opportunity to enter a
possible contribution or a possible contribution and possible reduction decisions into a non-binding communication ﬁeld
would also have no effect according to theory, assuming common knowledge of payoff maximizing type. Under that
common knowledge assumption, each agent realizes that each other agent will contribute nothing to the group account
and spend nothing on punishment, regardless of what numbers are communicated, and there is therefore no reason to pay
any attention either to the numbers typed by others or to the numbers that one types oneself. A pure numerical babble is
always an equilibrium.
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Suppose, instead, that our subjects believe that another type of agent, whose objectives include but are not limited to
earning more money, is present in the subject pool with some non-negligible probability. Although unconditional altruists
and individuals who experience a ‘‘warm glow’’ from contributing are among the potentially interesting possibilities (see
Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997, and references therein), we focus here on three possible ‘‘non-standard’’ preferences: Positive
and negative reciprocity, and truth-telling. A positively reciprocating agent is one who prefers to cooperate if he believes
that others are cooperating. A negatively reciprocating agent is willing to incur a cost to punish someone who exploits him
by free riding.
8 An agent with a preference for truth-telling can be seen either as obtaining additional utility from adhering
to her word, or as suffering a loss of utility if she breaks her word.
9 Finally, suppose that subjects begin with some prior
beliefs about the proportions of such individuals who are present and adjust their choices during the course of play as they
update those beliefs. Subjects thus enter into a Bayesian game of the type analyzed by Kreps et al. (1982) and Guttman
(2003).
If a group of reciprocators with optimistic expectations of one another’s type are grouped together in a basic VCM
experiment such as our B treatment, it is possible that they will contribute all or most of their endowments on the
ﬁrst decision and that, with their favorable beliefs thus supported, they will continue to contribute most of their
endowments (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; Ga ¨chter and Tho ¨ni, 2005). Probably more typical is an encounter of subjects
with differing degrees of reciprocity and differing initial beliefs. Upon seeing some low contributions, the reciprocators in
such a group will begin to reduce their contributions to the group account, in the B treatment, leading to the gradual
downward slide that is usually seen in ﬁnitely repeated VCM experiments. Allow the reciprocators to punish the free
riders while maintaining their own high contributions, however, as in our R treatment, and contributions may stabilize
or rise rather than fall, as is found by Fehr and Ga ¨chter (2000a), Masclet et al. (2003), BPP, Page et al. (2005), and Sefton
et al. (2007).
Consider now what communication might add to the Bayesian story. The opportunity to send numerical signals would
not necessarily be viewed as useless by subjects who believe reciprocators or truth-tellers are common. Suppose, for
example, that a substantial proportion of subjects are reciprocators and truth-tellers, and that all subjects know this to be
so, although they do not know which individuals are and which are not of these types. Then subjects with the relevant
preferences might, by entering a high number, try to signal intentions to contribute their endowments conditional on
others doing so, and if others seem to signal a similar intention, they might proceed to contribute in fact and see whether
the others follow through. If the game includes punishment opportunities, the reciprocators might signal intentions to
punish low contributors, and some might follow through with actual punishment when they see evidence of attempts to
mislead by contributing less than announced. Opportunistic subjects whose only goal is to maximize their payoffs might
also signal and act cooperatively in some periods, with the intention of later exploiting the credulity of fellow players by
signaling an intention to contribute but not following through.
The predictions of the Bayesian model which allows for non-standard player types and of the standard model
with common knowledge of universal payoff maximizing type are clearly quite different. The standard model
implies that ‘‘numerical cheap talk’’ will be of no consequence, and might even be a stream of random numbers.
The Bayesian model suggests that we should look for signs of attempts to coordinate, on the parts of some subjects,
and of attempts to mislead, on the parts of others. BPP’s analysis, which showed that outcomes in the NCT (respectively,
NCTwR) treatment were on average indistinguishable from those in the counterpart B (respectively, R) treatment, is
apparently consistent with the standard prediction regarding communication; but it does not rule out the Bayesian one. A
more micro-analytic look at messages, and at inter-group differences in outcomes, is required in order to see whether NCT
was really babble or was instead a ﬂow of meaningful messages between subjects who viewed one another’s preferences as
an open question.
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7 As shown in Farrel-Rabin (1996), conﬂict of interest among agents means that messages cannot be self-signaling or self-committing. In such a case,
if agents maximize their payoffs and types are common knowledge, it is always consistent to treat cheap talk as meaningless. The ﬁnding that the
messages do not seem to be babble, in our experiment, implies that the subjects do not believe all to be rational payoff maximizers.
8 See Fehr and Ga ¨chter (2000b) and Hoffman et al. (1998), who treat conditional cooperation and willingness to punish noncooperation as two sides
of the same trait. O ¨nes and Putterman (2007) consider that the relative degrees of positive and of negative reciprocity may differ from one reciprocator to
another.
9 Sa ´nchez-Page ´s and Vorsatz (2007) ﬁnd evidence for the presence of subjects with what they deem to be two distinct social preferences, lie-aversion
and preference for truth-telling, in sender–receiver games with conﬂicting preferences. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) suggest that players may keep
their word due to a desire to avoid harming others by falsely altering their expectations. Bicchieri (2005) discusses the activation of a norm of promise-
keeping.
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3.1. Contributions and earnings trends
Fig.1 shows the average number of dollars contributed to the public good in the six treatments, by period.
10 The pattern
of contributions in the B treatment conforms well to expectations from the literature: A substantial average initial
contribution followed by a generally declining trend.
11 In the R treatment, as in the similar treatment in Fehr and Ga ¨chter
(2000a), contributions show no pattern of decay until the end of the session, an outcome that analysis shows to be
attributable, at least in part, to the tendency of many subjects to impose costly punishment on low contributors.
12 This
tendency is not signiﬁcantly less in evidence in the last period, suggesting that it is indeed attributable to a taste, rather
than being undertaken to raise future earnings.
Average contribution and its trend in the NCT and NCTwP treatments resemble closely those of their no communication
and no promise counterpart, the B treatment, and the same holds when comparing the NCTwR treatment to its counterpart
treatment, R. Mann–Whitney tests conﬁrm that average contributions over the 10 periods as a whole do not differ
signiﬁcantly as between the NCT, NCTwP and B treatments, or as between the NCTwR and R treatments (see Appendix,
Table A.1).
13 It appears on ﬁrst inspection, then, that giving subjects the opportunity to announce possible decisions before
each set of binding decisions made no difference to contributions. However, the combination of punishment opportunities,
opportunities to make numerical announcements, and opportunities to send promise statements raised contributions in
the NCTwP&R above those in the R and NCTwR treatments, signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively, hence also
above those of the other three treatments.
Result 1. Apart from the NCTwP&R treatment, average contributions and their trend over time differ signiﬁcantly only between
treatments without punishment opportunities and those with such opportunities. Contributions are higher on average and are





















Fig. 1. Average contribution per period, by treatment.
10 Average contribution and earning trends in the B, R, NCT, and NCTwR treatments are shown in BPP and are reviewed here before our more detailed
analysis, and for comparison with the new treatments, NCTwP and NCTwP&R.
11 Past results are surveyed in Davis and Holt (1993) and Ledyard (1995).
12 The failure of contributions to rise as steeply in the R treatment as they do in Fehr and Ga ¨chter’s punishment condition could be due to minor
differences in design. A similar tendency for the introduction of a punishment stage to stem the usual decaying trend but without signiﬁcant upward
trend is also found in other replications of Fehr and Ga ¨chter, for example Carpenter and Matthews (2002). See also Nikiforakis and Normann (2008),w h o
ﬁnd that the trend of contributions depends on the effectiveness of punishment (that is, cost to the person punished).
13 Appendix Table A.2 shows average contributions by treatment. Since group members had no knowledge of what was occurring in any of the other
groups in their session or other sessions, and group behaviors are thus statistically independent, our non-parametric tests use the group average
contribution or the group average earning level of a subject, averaged over all 10 periods, as observations. Table A.2 shows average contributions by
treatment. Since group members had no knowledge of what was occurring in any of the other groups in their session or other sessions, and group
behaviors are thus statistically independent, our non-parametric tests use the group average contribution or the group average earning level of a subject,
averaged over all 10 periods, as observations. The Appendix is available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis%5FPutterman/working/pdfs/
AppendixNotJustBabble%204-24-07.pdf.
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of numerical communication signiﬁcantly affect average earnings, nor does adding promise opportunities alone do so.
14
Even though contributions are more sustained in treatments with punishment, earnings are not higher in those treatments,
because the costly punishment that induces the higher contributions cancels out the associated earnings gain.
15 Earnings
are, however, higher in the NCTwP&R treatment, where higher contributions are attained with less punishment (as will be
shown later).
Result 2. Apart from the NCTwP&R treatment, average earnings do not differ signiﬁcantly between treatments. Average earnings
are higher in NCTwP&R than in all other treatments.
3.2. Differing dispersions of group outcomes
Although there is little difference between the B and NCT (R and NCTwR) treatments with respect to average behaviors,
we noticed that there was greater variation among groups in treatments with NCT. Fig. 3 shows the variance of average
contribution among groups in each treatment, by period. In the left panel, containing the treatments without reductions,
the variances are noticeably higher for the two treatments that include NCT, in all periods. In the right panel, containing the
treatments with reductions, variances are higher for NCTwR than for R in all but one period, but the variance in
contributions is lowest in NCTwP&R except in two periods. Table 2 conﬁrms that on average, the variance among groups is
higher in the NCT and NCTwP treatments than in the B treatment, and higher in the NCTwR treatment than in the R
treatment. Formal statistical tests are ruled out unless one considers the variance in each period to be independent of
that in other periods; if we assume that to be the case, the variances are found to be signiﬁcantly different (see Appendix
Table A.3).
16
Result 3. Except when combined with promises and reductions, the introduction of numerical announcements increased the



















Fig. 2. Average earnings per period, by treatment.
14 See the lower left portion of Appendix Table A.1 for the test outcomes, and the right column of Appendix Table A.2 for average earnings by
treatment.
15 Cinyabuguma et al. (2004) show that about 20% of earnings reductions in the R treatment were aimed at high rather than low contributors, and
that absent these reductions and the immediate lowering of contributions that they led to, earnings would have been higher in the R than in the B
treatment. Ertan et al. (forthcoming) show that earnings rise unambiguously compared with baseline treatments if only punishment of low contributors is
permitted (as is the case in their experiments when subjects vote on what types of punishment to permit). On ‘‘misdirected’’ or ‘‘anti-social punishment,’’
see also Herrmann et al. (2008).
16 We performed both Mann–Whitney tests, which treat each of the 10 variances (one for each period) for each treatment symmetrically, and
Wilcoxon tests, which pair the variances of two treatments to be compared for period 1, for period 2, etc. As Appendix Table A.3 reports, both tests
conclude that variances are greater in NCT compared to B, in NCTwP compared to B, and in NCTwR compared to R, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As an
additional check, we graphed the average contributions of the three highest-contributing and of the three lowest-contributing groups in each pair of
treatments, and found high (low) performers contributing more (less) in NCT and NCTwP than in B and in NCTwR than in R in almost every period. Using
either average contribution or average deviation from treatment average contribution or both, the differences are mildly statistically signiﬁcant (despite
having only 3 observations per group) for high groups in NCT vs. B and NCTwR vs. R, and for low groups in NCTwR vs. R. Both the highest and lowest
performing groups in NCTwP&R contributed more than (for highest groups: more than or the same as) their R and NCTwR counterparts in every period,
however, with these differences also being signiﬁcant. See Figs. A1 and A2 and test details in the Appendix, Section 3.
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What can account for the greater variance of outcomes in groups with numerical communication? One possibility is
that groups having members more inclined towards truth-telling and reciprocity achieved and sustained greater
cooperation, whereas groups with higher proportions of opportunistic individuals had worse outcomes when
announcements were possible than when they were not. For this conjecture to hold true, subjects would have to take
announcements as more than random babble. The next three results will demonstrate this, beginning by showing that
subjects responded to one another’s announced plans by changing their announcements, in much the same way as they
responded to one another’s binding decisions by changing their subsequent binding decisions in treatments without
communication.
Table 3 reports panel corrected standard error regressions which help to establish the proposition that subjects who
found their announced possible contribution to be greater (less) than their group’s average tended to reduce (increase) it
from iteration to iteration in a given period’s announcement stage. The change in announced contribution is the dependent
variable, and in addition to the difference between own and others’ previous announced contribution, the subject’s own
previous announced contribution is included.
17 For comparison, parallel regressions on the relationship between actual
contributions and actual contributions of the previous period were estimated for the B and R treatments (see the Appendix,
Table A.4). For both actual contributions and announcements, the coefﬁcients on the contribution difference are always
negative, supporting the proposition, signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in all but one speciﬁcation. Adjustment of
contributions toward group average may be a reﬂection of conditionally cooperative behavioral tendencies.
18 Due to
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Fig. 3. Variance of average contribution across groups by period and treatment.
17 Subjects who entered only one contribution announcement during a given period’s communication stage are treated as having an announcement
change of zero.
18 Fischbacher et al. (2001) ﬁnd that 50% of their subjects contribute more when they expect others also to do so, with a further 14% also doing this so
long as average contributions remain below half of the endowment. Similar results are reported by Kurzban and Houser (2001).
19 In Table 3 and others to come later, we show regressions that include period or individual (elsewhere, group) ﬁxed effects in order to control for
possible interdependence of observations (exceptions are Tables 4 and 6 where we report a series of tobit regressions that contain group and period ﬁxed
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results to be supportive of the same tendency to adjust contributions or announced contributions toward the group
average, signiﬁcant at the 1% level for announced contributions (and at the 5% level for actual contributions; for details see
the Appendix, Part 5).
Result 4. During communication periods, subjects in the NCT and NCTwR treatments adjusted their announced contributions in
the direction of the average announced contributions of other group members, paralleling period-to-period movements in binding
contributions in the B and R treatments.
A second common response seen in binding play is that when a group member contributes a substantially smaller
amount than others, he or she tends to be targeted for punishment.
20 We next check whether a parallel phenomenon is
found in the interactions between announcements. The ﬁrst column of Table 4 reports a random effects tobit regression in
which the amount of announced reductions aimed at subject j is the dependent variable, and the absolute negative and
positive deviations of j’s announced contribution from the average of other group members, and that average itself, are
independent variables.
21 The second column reports an otherwise identical tobit regression with group ﬁxed effects.
22 The
coefﬁcient on absolute negative deviation is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while that on absolute positive
deviation is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level, indicating that subjects were assigned more (less) announced
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Table 3
Adjustment of announced contributions in response to differences from means, NCT and NCTwR treatments
Dependent variable: First change of announced contribution by subject i
NCT NCTwR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1st announced contribution
by i) (average 1st
announced contribution by
others in i’s group)
 0.366  0.311  0.375  0.232  0.079  0.243
(0.073) (0.089) (0.073) (0.075) (0.098) (0.076)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.418] [0.001]
1st announced contribution
by i
 0.343  0.498  0.332  0.376  0.692  0.361
(0.078) (0.102) (0.080) (0.084) (0.115) (0.085)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 2.348 1.306 1.817 2.812 4.994 1.911
(0.635) (1.311) (0.774) (0.727) (1.274) (0.819)
[0.001] [0.319] [0.019] [0.001] [0.001] [0.020]
Individual ﬁxed effects No Yes No No Yes No
[0.001] [0.001]
Period ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes
[0.691] [0.270]
R
2 0.339 0.434 0.348 0.242 0.374 0.260
Note: Panel corrected standard errors regression. N ¼ 440, all regressions. In all regressions in this and the remaining tables, numbers in parentheses are
standard-errors and numbers in square brackets are p-values. In the individual and period ﬁxed effects rows, numbers in square brackets are p-values of
tests of the joint signiﬁcance of individual ﬁxed effects, and period ﬁxed effects, respectively.
(footnote continued)
effects simultaneously). Inclusion of both period and individual effects simultaneously tends to reduce the signiﬁcance levels of some coefﬁcients, but
never changes their signs and has relatively small impacts on their magnitudes. We report the results, where different, in footnotes. With respect to the
estimated coefﬁcient of the ﬁrst explanatory variable in Table 3, the estimates with both ﬁxed effects reduce its signiﬁcance to the 10% level except in the
case of Table 3 regression for the NCTwR treatment, in which the coefﬁcient estimate becomes insigniﬁcant (as is already the case in column (5)).4
20 See, for example, Table 5 in Fehr and Ga ¨chter (2000a), Table 3 in Cinyabuguma et al. (2006), and Table 2 in O ¨nes and Putterman (2007).
21 Tobit estimation is used because there are numerous cases of zero punishment which constitute potentially censored observations. In particular,
251 of the 440 observations in the announced punishment regression and 282 of the 440 observations in the actual punishment regressions have zero
values of the dependent variable. Following Fehr and Ga ¨chter, the negative deviation variable is assigned a value of zero if j contributed more than the
average of other group members, and likewise for the positive deviation variable if j contributed less than the others’ average.
22 Both regressions also contain period ﬁxed effects.
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fourth columns show parallel regressions, also using data from the NCTwR treatment, but this time data on actual, as
opposed to announced, contributions and reductions. We ﬁnd that the interactions of announced decisions follow a closely
similar pattern to the interactions of actual decisions. The parallelism of the two regressions deﬁes the idea that numbers
communicated amounted to random noise. Again, we also conducted non-parametric correlation tests, which strongly
conﬁrm the relationship between absolute negative deviation of announced contribution and announced punishment; see
the Appendix, Part 6, for details (The remaining columns of Table 4 are discussed in connection with Result 8, below.)
Result 5. The relationship between announced punishment and announced contribution replicates that between actual
punishment and actual contribution: The less one’s (announced) contribution relative to others in one’s group, the more one is
targeted for (announced) punishment.
Our last demonstration that subjects adjusted their announcements in response to one another’s announcements in a
fashion paralleling changes in binding decisions involves the inﬂuence of announced punishment on subsequent
announced contribution. Cinyabuguma et al. (2004, Table 2) and O ¨nes and Putterman (2007, Table 3) show that in ﬁnitely
repeated partner treatments like those studied here, low (high) contributing subjects who receive punishment tend to
increase (reduce) their contributions in the next period. Table 5 shows panel corrected standard errors regressions in which
the dependent variable is subject j’s initial change of contribution announcement during each communication period. The
independent variables are the number of dollars by which others announce that they might reduce j’s earnings, interacted
with dummy variables to distinguish those announcing their group’s highest contribution from others.
23 Three
speciﬁcations are estimated for the NCTwR treatment, three for NCTwP&R, differing in inclusion of ﬁxed effects for
individuals and/or periods. All of the ﬁrst coefﬁcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that those who
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Table 4
Announced and actual reductions as a function of announced and actual contribution deviations and the deviation of actual from announced contribution,
NCTwR treatment
Dependent variable
Announced pun. ‘‘received’’ by j Actual punishment received by j
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Absolute negative deviation 1.741 1.761 1.097 1.113 1.096 1.106
(0.161) (0.150) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Absolute positive deviation  0.679  0.868  0.496  0.558  0.482  0.543
(0.362) (0.332) (0.175) (0.180) (0.175) (0.180)
[0.061] [0.009] [0.005] [0.002] [0.006] [0.003]
Average contrib. (j excluded)  1.152  1.393  0.088  0.159  0.077  0.153
(0.318) (0.336) (0.086) (0.113) (0.086) (0.112)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.306] [0.160] [0.373] [0.174]
Difference between announced and actual contrib. 0.122 0.169
(0.064) (0.083)
[0.058] [0.043]
Constant 4.619 2.535  2.293  2.421  2.418  2.948
(3.056) (3.447) (1.116) (1.364) (1.113) (1.390)
[0.131] [0.462] [0.040] [0.077] [0.030] [0.035]
Random effects tobit Yes Yes Yes
Tobit with group ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
LR test p-value 0.001 1.000 1.000
Log-likelihood  770.33  705.33  569.36  562.29  567.57  560.23
Note: Tobit regressions and random effects tobit regressions with period ﬁxed effects. N ¼ 440, all regressions.
23 Hence, the ﬁrst (second) variable is 0 if i is (not) the highest announced contributor.
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dollar of announced punishment ‘‘received’’ in the NCTwR (NCTwP&R) treatment, a reaction qualitatively identical and
quantitatively similar to that found for actual contributions following actual punishment. The second coefﬁcient is
consistently negative, suggesting that a targeted high contributor might slightly reduce her announcement, as also found
for contributions in the studies cited above, but this coefﬁcient is less statistically signiﬁcant in NCTwR, and insigniﬁcant in
NCTwP&R.
24 Corresponding non-parametric tests of the correlation between the ﬁrst change of j’s announced contribution
and the amount of punishment aimed at j if j is not the group’s highest contributor, by period, are reported in the Appendix,
Part 7, and are generally signiﬁcant and positive for the NCTwR treatment, but more mixed for NCTwP&R treatment.
Result 6. In response to announced possible punishment, subjects who announced low contributions tended to increase their
announced possible contributions.
3.4. Subjects’ binding decisions also responded to others’ announcements
Did announcements inﬂuence other announcements only, or did they inﬂuence binding, costly decisions? In this
section, we demonstrate that the latter is the case.
First, both regressions and non-parametric statistical tests show that binding contributions are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by announced possible contributions. We estimate panel corrected standard error regressions in which subject i’s
contribution in period t, t ¼ 2,y,9, is the dependent variable, and the independent variables are the average contribution
by the others in i’s group in period t 1, the average last announced contribution of the others in the period t
communication stage, and i’s last announced contribution in that stage (see Appendix Table A.9).
25 As before, three
speciﬁcations are estimated for each of two treatments, varying with regard to what ﬁxed effects are included. Own
announcement is signiﬁcantly related to own actual contribution for both NCT and NCTwR subjects, suggesting a tendency
by most subjects to make more-or-less truthful announcements (whether out of genuine aversion to lying or to contribute
to others’ beliefs—which may redound to one’s own beneﬁt—that honest types may be present). In both treatments, actual
last period average contribution by others signiﬁcantly and positively affects own contribution. Finally, and most
importantly, average of others’ most recent announced contribution has a positive coefﬁcient in all of the regressions, is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level in one of the NCTand one of the NCTwR regressions, and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the other
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Table 5
Responses to announced reduction threats
Dependent variable: First change in j’s announced possible contribution
NCTwR NCRwP&R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial announced reductions,
if j is not the maximum
announced contributor
0.244 0.283 0.247 0.168 0.140 0.169
(0.042) (0.048) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Initial announced reductions,
if j is the maximum
announced contributor
 0.163  0.155  0.135  0.190  0.212  0.196
(0.071) (0.077) (0.069) (0.154) (0.158) (0.157)
[0.023] [0.045] [0.052] [0.215] [0.180] [0.213]
Constant  0.604  0.468  1.000  0.610 0.085  0.659
(0.178) (0.478) (0.513) (0.116) (0.088) (0.135)
[0.001] [0.327] [0.052] [0.001] [0.336] [0.001]
Individual ﬁxed effects No Yes No No Yes No
[0.004] [0.075]
Period ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes
[0.322] [0.010]
R
2 0.132 0.268 0.152 0.040 0.220 0.054
Note: Panel corrected standard errors regression. N ¼ 440, all regressions.
24 Coefﬁcients on both variables change little if both individual and period ﬁxed effects are used, although the coefﬁcient on the second explanatory
variable falls somewhat short of the 10% signiﬁcance cut-off for both treatments, in this case.
25 Period 1 must be excluded to allow for the lagged average contribution term, and period 10 is left out to exclude potential end-game effects.
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26 Corresponding non-parametric tests, almost all of which produce statistically signiﬁcant results,
are reported in Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11.
Result 7. In the NCT and NCTwR treatments, actual contributions in a period are positively related to own announced
contribution and to the average of others’ announced contributions.
A still more striking indication that ‘‘cheap talk’’ announcements had impacts on costly binding decisions is the ﬁnding
that many subjects incurred real monetary costs to punish ‘‘lying’’ about contribution ‘‘intentions.’’
27 The last two columns
of Table 4 report tobit regressions with the same speciﬁcation as the middle two (discussed in connection with Result 5,
above), except that the difference between j’s last announced contribution and his/her actual contribution in the same
period is added as an independent variable. The new variable has a positive coefﬁcient signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the
random effects tobit estimate and at the 5% level in the tobit estimate with group ﬁxed effects. These estimates imply that
for every one dollar of difference between announced and actual contribution, a subject received on average about 12–17
cents of punishment. This amount of punishment may not have sufﬁced to induce much more truth-telling, but it is
important for our purposes because it demonstrates that rather than treating one another’s announcements as noise, many
subjects predicated costly decisions on them. Non-parametric tests are also broadly consistent, although differing by period
in level of signiﬁcance (see the Appendix, Part 9).
Result 8. Subjects received costly punishment for contributing less than their announced ‘‘possible’’ contribution.
A likely reason why the NCTwP&R treatment succeeded where the NCTwP treatment did not is that more subjects were
deterred from using the promise option opportunistically in NCTwP&R since other group members had the possibility of
inﬂicting monetary costs on them were they to contribute less than the promised amount .W e ’ v ej u s ts e e nt h a tf a l s e
announcements were punished in the NCTwR treatment, yet contributions and earnings in that treatment did not exceed those
in treatment R. Punishment of false promises in NCTwP&R seems likely to have made a decisive difference only if its magnitude
was greater, which could conceivably be the case if broken promise statements engendered greater anger or indignation.
Table 6 reports a series of tobit regressions
28 resembling the last speciﬁcation in Table 4, with the addition of a dummy variable
controlling for the choice of a promise, and a few changes made necessary by unusually high correlations among certain
variables.
29 Columns 1 and 2 contain the basic results paralleling Fehr and Ga ¨chter’s, indicating that subjects received more
punishment the further below others’ average was their contribution.
30 In the NCTwP treatment, subjects chose the promise
statement in 78.4% of opportunities to do so; for NCTwP&R, the corresponding ﬁgure is 86.8%. In columns 3 and 4, we add the
dummy variable for contributing less than promised and ﬁnd it to have highly signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients, implying that a
subject received an average of between 4.69 and 4.99 experimental dollars of punishment if she broke a promise—although the
dummy for making a promise also becomes signiﬁcant and of opposite sign, rendering the net negative impact of making and
breaking a promise some 40% smaller. In columns 5 and 6, we use instead a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the
subject contributed less than her last ‘‘numerical cheap talk’’ announcement. This term also obtains highly signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcients, although the indicated average punishment is smaller, between E$2.44 and E$3.48. In columns 7 and 8 both dummy
variables are included. In the random effects speciﬁcation of column 7, both variables have signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, but in the ﬁxed
effects speciﬁcation of column 8, only the promise dummy is signiﬁcant. In both cases, the coefﬁcients suggest at least twice as
much punishment for failing to fulﬁll a promise as for failing to live up to an announcement.
31
These results strongly suggest that breaking a promise was likely to attract more punishment than was failing to fulﬁll
an announcement. The net punishment per promise broken, estimated from columns 3 and 4 as E$2.61–E$2.78, can
be compared to the monetary gain from breaking a promise, which averaged only E$2.87 per episode, suggesting that
a promise breaker achieved little or no net gain on average.
32 We also conducted non-parametric tests of the correlations
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26 The coefﬁcient on the ﬁrst variable is positive but considerably smaller and insigniﬁcant when both individual and period ﬁxed effects are used in
the NCT treatment regression. The coefﬁcient on the second variable is little changed but its signiﬁcance level just misses the 10% cut-off value in the
corresponding estimate for the NCTwR treatment.
27 Recall that the instructions referred to each number communicated only as a ‘‘possible choice’’ and added ‘‘You are not committed to any of the
numbers you type in during this stage.’’ So the numbers need not have been viewed as declarations of commitment or intention.
28 As with Table 4, a tobit is used because of the large number of zero cases; here 336 of the 440 observations involve zero punishment and are thus
potentially left-censored.
29 To reduce multicolinearity we substitute, for the size of the deviations between actual and announced or promised contribution, dummy variables
equaling 1 if the individual contributed less than announced or promised, and zero otherwise.
30 In two speciﬁcations of this table, absolute positive deviation also obtains signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients. These are suggestive of the presence of
some ‘‘perverse punishment,’’ punishing of higher contributors by low ones that is found in other studies (see footnote 15 and the sources cited there).
However, the corresponding coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant in other estimates, including all of the table’s ﬁxed effects estimates, or alternative estimates
in which we drop the ‘‘others’ average contribution’’ term.
31 To be sure, there is a high correlation (0.700) between the two dummy variables, and most subjects who broke a promise were simultaneously
failing to fulﬁll an announcement, so the reliability of column 7 and 8 estimates can be called into question. Comparison of columns 3 and 4 with columns
5 and 6 provides some independent evidence that a broken promise’s effect is the larger of the two.
32 Column 3 and 4 estimates suggest that making and keeping a promise reduced expected punishment by 1.91–2.38 experimental dollars, while
making and breaking a promise increased expected punishment by 2.78 ( ¼ 4.69–1.91) to 2.61 ( ¼ 4.99–2.38) experimental dollars. The estimated E$2.87
gain per episode of promise-breaking is derived from the fact that the overall average difference between amount promised and amount contributed, in
those cases in which a promise was not fulﬁlled, was E$4.78, and the subject saved E$0.60 for each E$1 not contributed.
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if any, by which i underfulﬁlled the amount he/she promised, and (c) the corresponding difference for underfulﬁlled
announcements. Almost all correlations are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (see the Appendix, Part 10).
Result 9. Contributing less than the amount speciﬁed in a promise statement drew costly punishment of even larger amount
than did contributing less than indicated as a ‘‘possible’’ contribution.
Results 4–9 suggest that many subjects attempted to use non-binding numerical announcements to coordinate on a
more rewarding cooperative strategy. One reason why outcomes were not on average better in the treatments
with numerical communication than in their counterpart treatments may be that in addition to such cooperation-seekers,
there were also subjects who intentionally used misleading signals to improve their individual returns from free riding. We
test this conjecture by testing whether groups in which there was less opportunistic ‘‘lying’’ about intentions had better
outcomes than those in which there was more ‘‘lying’’. Our tests show that the abuse of announcements to mislead other
subjects did indeed have a detrimental effect on cooperation.
Let ‘‘lie’’ denote the difference between a subject’s last announced contribution and her binding contribution in a given
period, and calculate a group’s ‘‘average lie’’ by dividing the sum of ‘‘lies’’ by the number of group members.
33 In Table 7,w e
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Table 6
Punishment received as a function of broken promises and other variables, NCTwP&R treatment
Dependent variable: actual punishment received by j
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Absolute negative deviation 1.355 1.530 0.951 1.147 1.052 1.311 0.882 1.111
(0.114) (0.135) (0.124) (0.143) (0.123) (0.145) (0.126) (0.145)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Absolute positive deviation 0.118  0.154 0.640 0.388 0.477 0.156 0.706 0.440
(0.297) (0.343) (0.312) (0.351) (0.307) (0.349) (0.311) (0.353)
[0.691] [0.654] [0.040] [0.270] [0.120] [0.654] [0.024] [0.214]
Average contribution (j excluded) 0.157  0.299 0.665 0.138 0.542  0.015 0.751 0.193
(0.200) (0.264) (0.221) (0.274) (0.218) (0.276) (0.224) (0.279)
[0.433] [0.257] [0.003] [0.614] [0.013] [0.954] [0.001] [0.489]
Dummy ¼ 1 if promise was made, 0 otherwise  0.161 0.583  2.378  1.908  0.351 0.326  2.013  1.728
(0.763) (0.871) (0.825) (0.952) (0.740) (0.838) (0.837) (0.963)
[0.833] [0.504] [0.004] [0.046] [0.635] [0.697] [0.016] [0.074]
Dummy ¼ 1 if promise was broken, 0 otherwise 4.993 4.692 3.913 4.165
(0.903) (1.005) (1.021) (1.121)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Dummy ¼ 1 if contributed less than last announced, 0 otherwise 3.475 2.437 1.777 0.893
(0.752) (0.820) (0.844) (0.891)
[0.001] [0.003] [0.035] [0.316]
Constant  3.293  2.467  6.275  4.228  7.215  5.233  7.578  5.062
(2.006) (2.885) (2.100) (2.869) (2.216) (3.023) (2.198) (2.991)
[0.101] [0.393] [0.003] [0.141] [0.001] [0.084] [0.001] [0.091]
Random effects tobit Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tobit with group ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
LR p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Log-likelihood  409.5  346.8  394.2  336.1  399.8  342.5  392.1  335.5
Note: Tobit regressions and random effects tobit regressions with period ﬁxed effects. N ¼ 440, all regressions.
33 Although the extent of an individual’s ‘‘lie’’ might be deﬁned as being equal to zero whenever his actual contribution exceeded his last announced
contribution in the communication round, we let ‘‘lie’’ (in the few cases of this type) take negative values.
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group and period, using average contribution in period t as dependent variable. Independent variables are the average ‘‘lie’’
last period (period t 1), the average last announcement in the communication stage of the current period (t), and in some
speciﬁcations group or period ﬁxed effects. The estimates support the idea that a previous period’s ‘‘lying’’ reduced the
current period’s contributions, in both treatments.
34
Result 10. Contributing less than announced led to lower future contributions in groups in the NCT and NCTwR treatments.
A similar analysis can be done for the NCTwP and NCTwP&R treatments, except that here effects of both the average gap
between announced and actual contributions, and the average gap between promised and actual contributions, can be
studied. Table 8 reports panel corrected standard error regressions at group level that parallel those in Table 7 but include
both lagged variables and both the average last announced contribution and the average last promised contribution.
35 The
estimates for the NCTwP treatment support the idea that both failure to fulﬁll announcements and lying on promises
reduced subsequent contributions, although only the coefﬁcient on the ﬁrst variable is statistically signiﬁcant when group
ﬁxed effects are included (column (2)).
36 Those for the NCTwP&R treatment indicate even larger negative effects of lying on
promises, but the coefﬁcient on this variable is again insigniﬁcant when group ﬁxed effects are used, and the
coefﬁcients for lie on announcement are in this case positive, contrary to expectation.
37 The high correlation between the
magnitudes of the two kinds of promise breaking, and the likely persistence of behaviors over time within groups which is
suggested by the signiﬁcant group ﬁxed effect coefﬁcients and the higher R
2’s in regressions (2) and (5), make it
particularly useful in this case to check bi-variate correlations that use only one observation per group. We ﬁnd that for the
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Table 7
The negative impact of ‘‘lying’’ on group performance in NCT and NCTwR
Dependent variable: Average contribution in group, period t
NCT NCTwR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average ‘‘lie’’ in t 1  0.617  0.318  0.580  0.587  0.033  0.599
(0.078) (0.088) (0.084) (0.114) (0.096) (0.116)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.727] [0.001]
Last average announcement in t 0.726 0.381 0.725 0.984 0.366 0.984
(0.060) (0.118) (0.056) (0.070) (0.103) (0.070)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.604 3.286 0.620  0.470 2.142  0.754
(0.434) (1.084) (1.612) (0.618) (0.987) (0.764)
[0.164] [0.002] [0.312] [0.447] [0.030] [0.324]
Group ﬁxed effects No Yes No No Yes No
[0.001] [0.001]
Period ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes
[0.291] [0.971]
R
2 0.631 0.796 0.664 0.736 0.852 0.743
Note: Panel corrected standard errors regression. N ¼ 88, all regressions.
34 Estimated coefﬁcients on average ‘‘lie’’ in t 1 are negative but insigniﬁcant when both group and period ﬁxed effects are included. Non-parametric
tests yield negative correlation coefﬁcients in all periods, but most are insigniﬁcant, perhaps in part due to the small sample size. See the Appendix, part
11.
35 The table’s row headings denote a ‘‘lie’’ on announcement by ‘‘‘lie’’ on A’ and a ‘‘lie’’ on promise by ‘‘‘lie’’ on P,’ the variables being measured as
contribution amount announced or promised minus actual amount contributed. ‘‘‘Lie’’ on promise’ is deﬁned as 0 for subjects not choosing the promise
statement, and ‘average last promised contribution’ is the average choice of those in a group selecting the promise statement, only, and is treated as 0
when no member of a group selected that statement.
36 The same holds when both group and period ﬁxed effects are included.
37 The same holds when both group and period ﬁxed effects are included.
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is negative in all pairs of periods, and is of statistically signiﬁcant magnitude for half of them. More generally, correlations
between both average lie on promise and average lie on announcement are negative in all periods in both treatments (see
the Appendix, Part 12).
Result 11. The greater the degree to which members contributed less than announced or promised, the smaller were average
subsequent contributions in groups.
Together, Results 10 and 11 suggest that differences in the extent of false announcements and promises help to account
for differences in achieved cooperation. The ‘‘ﬂip side’’ of the ﬁnding that ‘‘lies’’ undermined cooperation is that honesty
promoted it.
3.5. Punishment of broken promises kept ‘‘lying’’ in check in the NCTwP&R treatment
The facts that false promises were heavily punished (Result 9) and that fulﬁlled promises led to greater cooperation
(Result 11) can explain the higher contributions in the NCTwP&R treatment provided that subjects responded to the
punishment of false announcements and promises by being more truthful in their communications. By making
communications more credible, this could make more credible the threat that free riding would be met by actual
punishment. If free-riding could thus be deterred by cost-free announcements rather than costly punishment,
contributions would rise without offsetting punishment costs. And with assurance that others would contribute more,
conditionally-cooperative subjects would also contribute more.
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Table 8
The negative impact of ‘‘lying’’ on group performance, NCTwP and NCTwP&R treatments
Dependent variable: Average contribution in group, period t
NCTwP NCTwP&R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average ‘‘lie’’ on A, t 1  0.295  0.259  0.265 0.292 0.390 0.415
(0.122) (0.113) (0.125) (0.210) (0.190) (0.230)
[0.016] [0.023] [0.035] [0.165] [0.040] [0.070]
Average last announced contribution 0.682 0.439 0.696 0.651 0.469 0.644
(0.126) (0.136) (0.122) (0.133) (0.122) (0.133)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Average ‘‘lie’’ on P, t 1  0.255  0.024  0.259  0.679  0.298  0.535
(0.112) (0.112) (0.110) (0.265) (0.267) (0.292)
[0.023] [0.826] [0.018] [0.011] [0.263] [0.067]
Average last promised contribution 0.151 0.165 0.195 0.284 0.252 0.267
(0.145) (0.145) (0.139) (0.096) (0.075) (0.102)
[0.299] [0.253] [0.163] [0.003] [0.001] [0.009]
Constant  0.360 3.951  0.201 0.236 2.081 0.445
(1.066) (1.510) (1.161) (1.252) (1.427) (1.335)
[0.735] [0.009] [0.863] [0.850] [0.863] [0.739]
Group ﬁxed effects No Yes No No Yes No
[0.001] [0.001]
Period ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes
[0.270] [0.691]
R
2 0.583 0.758 0.623 0.569 0.757 0.576
Note: Panel corrected standard errors regression. N ¼ 88, all regressions.
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between announcements and binding decisions on contributions in the NCTwR and especially in the NCTwP&R
treatment. We graphed, for each of the four treatments with numerical communication, the evolution during the 10
periods of play of the average contribution initially announced in a period, the average ﬁnal announced contribution
in the same period, the average actual contribution, and for treatments with promise option, the average contribution
amount promised by those choosing the promise statement (see Appendix Fig. A.3). For the NCT and NCTwP treatments,
which lack punishment opportunities, announced possible contribution (and in NCTwP, promised contribution) is
either roughly constant or increases from ﬁrst to last announcement (and promise) of a period’s communication
phase, but average actual contribution falls further and further below the announcements and promises as the
experiment progresses. In the NCTwR treatment, we see no systematic tendency for promised amounts to either
increase or decrease during a given communication stage, and the gap between promised and actual contribution
grows more modestly with time, except for a last period jump. In the NCTwP&R treatment, however, ﬁrst and last
announced and promised amounts tend to converge as the experiment progresses, and actual contributions
show no tendency to diverge from promised and announced amounts until period 10. Mann–Whitney tests conﬁrm that
the average gap between promised and actual contribution is less in the NCTwP&R than in the NCTwP treatment, and that
the average gap between announced and actual contribution is less in NCTwP&R than in both NCTwP and NCT treatments,
with a less signiﬁcant difference in gap size between the NCTwR and the NCTwP and NCT treatments (see the Appendix,
Part 13).
Fig. 4 graphs by period, for the NCTwP and NCTwP&R treatments, the proportion of subjects who failed to contribute
as much as their last announcement and the proportion (of those choosing a promise statement) who failed to
contribute as much as promised. It shows a dramatic difference between the two treatments, with the proportion of
subjects not fulﬁlling their announcements and promises starting slightly higher and rising steeply toward about 70% in the
NCTwP treatment, whereas those proportions stay in the neighborhood of around 20% in the NCTwP&R treatment, with a
small last period up-tick. Mann–Whitney tests show that both the average proportion of unfulﬁlled announcements and
the average proportion of unfulﬁlled promises were signiﬁcantly lower in NCTwP&R treatment groups (see the Appendix,
Part 14).
Finally, we graphed the average cost of punishment per period due both to cost to punishers and money
lost by punishment recipients in the R, NCTwR and the NCTwP&R treatments. We ﬁnd total cost of punishment
to be lower in NCTwP&R than in NCTwR in all but one period, with the gap tending to widen after period 3.
Punishment costs are also higher in the R than in the NCTwP&R treatment in all but two periods (see Appendix Fig. A.4).
MW tests ﬁnd the average cost of punishment signiﬁcantly higher in NCTwR than in NCTwP&R, with a p-value
of 9%, but the differences in punishment costs between the other two treatments are not signiﬁcant (see the Appendix,
Part 15).
38
The fact that the roughly 80% honest announcement and promise rates in the treatment were achieved at modest social













Fig. 4. Proportion of lies on promises and announcement, NCTwP and NCTwP&R. Note: Diamonds ¼ proportion of lies on announcements in NCTwP,
Squares ¼ proportion of lies on announcements in NCTwP&R, Triangles ¼ proportion of lies on promises in NCTwP, Circles ¼ proportion of lies on
promises in NCTwP&R.
38 Interestingly, the average expenditure on punishment for the three groups that spend the least on it is E$3.83per period in the NCTwR treatment
versus 0 in the NCTwP&R treatment.
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cooperative subjects, explains why earnings were considerably higher in the NCTwP&R treatment.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Because no cooperative equilibrium is possible in a ﬁnitely repeated public goods game with rational payoff maximizing
agents having common knowledge of their types, standard economic theory implies that the addition of opportunities to
announce possible contributions in a non-binding fashion before costly play will have no effect. Being devoid of potential
efﬁcacy, any numerical messages sent could just as well be meaningless babble.
Our earlier experiment with non-binding numerical communication appeared to conﬁrm the expectation that such
communication has no effect on play, insofar as average binding behaviors followed approximately the same patterns with
as without announcement stages. However, by disaggregating the results to the level of individual groups and to within-
group interactions, we see that non-binding announcements helped some groups to cooperate, while leading to a more
complete break-down of cooperation in others. The increase in dispersion of group outcomes is evidently explained by
between-group differences in the extent to which subjects misled other group members with false announcements.
Subjects seemed to take their messages seriously, as evidenced by the fact that mutual adjustments of announced choices
display the same qualitative patterns as does real play, and by the fact that real contributions and, in treatments with
punishment opportunities, costly punishments are inﬂuenced by message content. It makes sense for opportunists to try to
‘‘set up’’ others so as to free ride on their contributions, but only if opportunists believe that their signals may be taken
seriously. To such opportunists, ‘‘talk is cheap’’ in the lay person’s common sense of that phrase, but not in the more
demanding sense of the kind of economic theory that assumes common knowledge and payoff maximization. That theory
would have talk be uniformly ignored by fully rational agents, and individuals, knowing that their talk would be ignored,
would waste no effort on issuing meaningful signals.
In BPP (2006), we had speculated that one reason why NCT was less effective overall than was verbal (including text)
communication is that NCT prevented subjects from framing their announcements in the moral language of explicit
promises. As a partial test of that conjecture, we conducted new experiments in which, in addition to typing ‘‘possible’’
decisions into the message space used in the ‘‘numerical cheap talk’’ treatments, subjects could select, or not, a statement
promising to contribute a speciﬁc amount to the public good. This test was imperfect, because we explicitly told subjects
that promises were not binding (rather than risk the possibility that promises would be fulﬁlled due to a misunderstanding
of the experiment’s rules), stirring up cynicism of a kind less likely to arise when subjects make promises in a more
spontaneous fashion. Nevertheless, the outcome supported the conjecture in one treatment, in which subjects could
impose costly punishments. Many subjects heavily punished ‘‘lying’’ on promise statements, and accordingly promises
became more truthful and more credible, permitting many groups to achieve high levels of cooperation partly through
cost-free threats and using less costly punishment.
The goal of our research has been to shed light on why communication aids cooperation, despite the predictions of
standard economic theory. Our experiments add weight to the evidence suggesting that (a) many decision-makers behave
as if they were maximizing something other than their monetary payoff alone, and that (b) most decision-makers act as if
they assume this to be the case. At least three ‘‘extended’’ or ‘‘non-standard’’ preferences may underlie the results of our
own and similar experiments. The efﬁcacy of written promises to contribute even in treatments without punishment
suggests that many subjects get disutility from breaking their word and/or believe this to be true of others, in which case
the exchanging of promises alters expectations about one another’s behaviors.
39 Many may also get higher subjective
payoffs from cooperating provided that others cooperate, so that what are prisoners’ dilemma payoffs in pecuniary terms
are assurance game payoffs in the space of utilities (Guttman, 2003; Page et al., 2005). Finally, many subjects display a
willingness to incur monetary costs in order to penalize free riders and those who deliberately mislead in their
announcements and promises.
In the real world, people frequently do cooperate in matters of common interest. A skeptical view is that when
businessmen, partners in political coalitions, and others get together to ﬁnd common ground, they simply bargain over the
terms of agreements and the penalties and other mechanisms they will put in place to make those agreements self-
enforcing for rational, self-interested agents, avoiding any reliance on non-material preferences or norms. A more natural
interpretation, however, is that such communication also allows parties to assess one another’s trustworthiness, or in the
language of economic theory, the content of their utility functions. Giving one’s word alters subsequent play in part
because some individuals can be counted on to penalize themselves, psychically, should they break such a bond, and
because the promiser, knowing human nature, knows that retaliation for betrayal may go beyond what is in the pecuniary
interest of the betrayed party.
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39 In a parallel line of research, Ben-Ner et al. (2007) investigate and ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts of numerical and chat room communication on trusting
and trustworthiness in the two-person sequential dilemma game called the trust or investment game. Also see again Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
and Sa ´nchez-Page ´s and Vorsatz (2007).
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